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ZIGLAR V. ABBASI AND ITS EFFECT ON 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
FEDERAL PRISONERS 
JULIO PEREYRA* 
In June 2017, the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi and held 
that prisoners unlawfully detained post-9/11 did not have a Bivens claim 
against policy-level federal executive branch officials and likely had no 
Bivens claim against the wardens at the facility where they were detained.  
In doing so, the Court drastically altered the analysis for deciding when a 
Bivens claim is new and for determining when a new Bivens claim should 
be either allowed by a court or precluded under a “special factors” 
analysis.  This change in the Bivens framework severely restricts the 
availability of factually novel Bivens claims, even those based on 
constitutional rights whose violation have generally been found to provide 
a cause of action.  The net result is that in many areas, Bivens probably no 
longer serves a deterrence function that is critical in safeguarding 
constitutional rights.  The most notable of these areas is federal prison 
litigation, where Bivens claims against individual officers are necessary for 
securing a number of rights guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment. 
Although prisoners subject to Eighth Amendment violations retain some 
remedies, without Bivens the remedial framework is incomplete and 
insufficient to fully assure constitutional rights.  This remedy gap is the 
result of an unprecedented shift away from the language and logic of 
previous Bivens opinions.  While the Court declined to adopt an even more 
radical retrenchment of Bivens, one that would restrict it to the facts of the 
first three cases adopting the remedy, there is a serious contention that its 
convoluted formulation of the rules reaches an identical substantive result.  
Therefore, the result of the Ziglar opinion is doubly troubling. Not only has 
the Court potentially left hundreds of thousands of prisoners with 
insufficient protection of their rights, but their means of doing so may lack 
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the clarity necessary to create the appropriate response from other 
institutional actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Money damage remedies in tort law serve two functions.  First, they 
allow victims to be made whole through compensation.1  Second, they hold 
tortfeasors liable to deter illegal behavior.2  In most cases, the deterrent 
function most clearly expresses the goal of the law.  For instance, a law 
providing money damages for battery more clearly expresses a policy of 
deterring battery rather than a policy of compensating for the resulting 
injury.  Over time, doctrines such as punitive damages have reified this 
 
 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 2011). 
 2 Id. at § 14. 
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deterrence function to allow victims a direct remedy for money damages.3  
A similar deterrence function has animated the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in a line of cases dealing with constitutional torts, i.e. claims against federal 
actors arising directly under the Constitution.4 
Starting in 1971 with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,5 the Supreme Court began allowing claims 
for money damages to be brought directly against officers in order to deter 
government torts.6  The Court would then extend the Bivens remedy to two 
other areas: gender discrimination by those not covered by Title VII,7 and 
claims by prisoners for violations of their Eighth Amendment rights.8  
These Bivens claims have become a necessary mechanism for not only 
compensating persons whose constitutional rights were violated, but also 
for ensuring that those rights are not violated in the first place. 
Despite their critical role ensuring constitutional rights are respected 
by federal officers, Bivens claims have often not fared well before the 
Supreme Court.  Since 1980, the Supreme Court has never recognized a 
Bivens remedy for a new constitutional provision,9 and has actually cut 
back on its availability in the areas where it exists.10  However, in curtailing 
Bivens, the Court has been careful to ensure that other mechanisms, such as 
statutory remedies or state tort law, are able to fulfill its deterrent 
function.11  By doing so, the Court is able to defer to Congressional action 
in creating causes of action without sacrificing constitutional rights.12  
Thus, even an overall narrower interpretation of Bivens has generally 
fulfilled its manifest purpose in areas where it is recognized, deterring 
 
 3 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (“Punitive damages may 
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct 
and deterring its repetition.”). 
 4 See Corr. Serv. Corp v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 62 (2001). 
 5 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 6 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 62 (“Bivens’ purpose is to deter individual federal officers . . . 
.”). 
 7 See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 247 n.26 (1979). 
 8 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16 
(1980). 
 9 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (“These three cases—Bivens, Davis, 
and Carlson—represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied 
damages remedy under the Constitution itself.”). 
 10 See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012) (declining to extend a Bivens remedy to a 
claim by a federal prisoner against an officer in a privately operated prison). 
 11 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 61 (declining to extend Bivens because state tort law 
provided adequate deterrence). 
 12 Id. at 71–72. 
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officers through a direct damage remedy where other mechanisms do not 
effectively doing so. 
Bivens deterrence is most important for claims brought by prisoners 
for violations of their Eighth Amendment rights.  In an area where the 
Constitution protects the right to be fed, clothed, and kept safe, a set of 
remedies to ensure these rights will be respected is fundamentally 
necessary.13  Bivens claims are a critical component of this set of remedies 
because alternative remedies have either been significantly curtailed,14 or 
designed with the presumption that a Bivens remedy will be available.15  
These two reasons have made Bivens the keystone of the network of 
remedies that protect federal prisoner rights. 
This keystone is likely dislodged with the Court’s recent opinion in 
Ziglar v. Abbasi.16  In Ziglar, the Court significantly reworked its approach 
to Bivens in a way that casts significant doubt on the continued ability of 
federal prisoners to bring Bivens claims that differ factually from the 
original Eighth Amendment Bivens case, Carlson v. Green, which provides 
a Bivens claim for prisoners who are denied proper medical attention.17 
Without a direct damage remedy against an offending officer to serve 
as a deterrent, a host of Eighth Amendment rights are significantly 
qualified.  For instance, negative rights change from the right to be free 
from a particular form of harm to solely the right to be compensated for it.18  
Positive rights, even if they are able to be secured through an injunction, 
must be re-litigated every two years.19  This erosion of Eighth Amendment 
rights denies more than one 100,000 federal prisoners rights equivalent to 
those secured to their state counterparts by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20  
While Ziglar dealt with persons detained in response to a national 
security crisis, the Court’s opinion has widespread ramifications for many 
 
 13 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE 
LAWYER’S HANDBOOK 17 (5th ed. 2010), http://jailhouselaw.org [https://perma.cc/9MKH-
LX5E] (citing case law enumerating various guarantees under the Eighth Amendment).  
 14 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1) (1997) (limiting injunctions to two years without a further 
showing of cause). 
 15 See James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121–22 (2009) (arguing that the Federal Tort 
Claims Act specifically preserves Bivens claims despite disallowing non-constitutional torts 
from being brought directly against federal officers). 
 16 Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1843 (2017). 
 17 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 18 See infra Part V(A). 
 19 See infra Part V(B). 
 20 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing a damage remedy to persons whose 
constitutional rights are violated by state actors). 
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people detained in federal prisons across the country.  This comment 
explains how the formulation of the Bivens framework established by 
Ziglar excludes nearly every Eighth Amendment violation in federal 
prisons from being brought as a Bivens claim.  This formulation is a break 
from previous Bivens jurisprudence and an unwise one––leaving federal 
prisoners without a direct damage remedy against officers who act 
unconstitutionally.  These prisoners are therefore unable to adequately 
protect their Eighth Amendment rights. 
I.  HISTORY OF BIVENS EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
A.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BIVENS REMEDY AND EXTENSION TO 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
Webster Bivens brought suit in federal court, claiming that federal agents 
had broken into his apartment, arrested him, and searched his home in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.21  He sought $15,000 in damages for 
the violation of his Constitutional rights, but the district court dismissed his 
claim for failing to state a cause of action.22  The Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court, expressing significant doubt about the propriety of 
permitting causes of action flowing directly from the Constitution.23 
The Supreme Court harbored no such doubts and held that a claim for 
damages could be implied directly from the text of the Constitution.24  
Justice Brennan, relying on the theory that for every violation of a right 
there is a remedy—and that the traditional remedy was money damages—
concluded that violations of Constitutional rights by government actors 
must necessarily give rise to a claim for money damages.25  Although they 
conceded that nothing in the Fourth Amendment’s text explicitly provided 
for this interpretation, the Court nonetheless held that a remedy was 
available to redress Bivens’ grievance.26 
 
 21 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
389 (1971). 
 22 Id. at 389–90. 
 23 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 
726 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Judicial recognition of private damage action under the Fourth 
Amendment would carry with it the responsibility for developing a body of federal common 
law . . . A federal court should not begin to travel down this long and uncertain road unless it 
is persuaded, as we are not, that the journey is essential to insure the vitality of a 
constitutional right.”). 
 24 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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The Court extended the Bivens remedy to Eighth Amendment claims 
in Carlson v. Green.27  Carlson was a lawsuit brought by Marie Green, the 
administratrix of Joseph Jones’ estate.28  She alleged that Jones, a chronic 
asthmatic and federal prisoner, had died after a severe asthma attack that 
had been grossly mishandled by prison medical staff.29   She further alleged 
that these facts amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical 
need in violation of Jones’ Eighth Amendment rights.30  Though the lower 
courts focused primarily on whether an Indiana state survivorship law 
applied to defeat Green’s action, the Supreme Court took a more holistic 
approach to considering the availability of a Bivens claim.31 
The Court began with the proposition that a Bivens claim should not 
be created to remedy a constitutional tort under two circumstances.32  The 
first circumstance is when “special factors counsele[d] hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress [permitting a Bivens action].”33  
The second is where a “defendant shows that Congress has provided an 
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for 
recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective.”34 
The Court found that neither of these considerations applied in this 
case.35  While the Court spent only two sentences on dismissing special 
factors, they found a longer discussion appropriate with regard to 
alternative remedies.36  Specifically, petitioners had raised the possibility 
that the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) could provide an alternative 
remedy.37  In rejecting the FTCA as an alternative remedy, the Court noted 
that the legislative history of the FTCA in no way indicated that Congress 
had intended to preempt a Bivens remedy.38  While the original FTCA had 
long predated the Courts development of the Bivens remedy, comments 
from its 1974 amendment indicated that Congress “view[ed] FTCA and 
Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”39 
 
 27 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 14 (1980). 
 28 Id. at 16. 
 29 Id. at 16 n.1. 
 30 Id. at 16. 
 31 Id. at 17–18. 
 32 Id. at 18. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 18–19. 
 35 Id. at 19. 
 36 Id. at 19–23. 
 37 Id. at 19. 
 38 Id. at 19–20. 
 39 Id. 
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The Court emphasized the fact that the FTCA did not supplant a 
Bivens remedy by highlighting the ways in which a Bivens remedy provided 
more effective relief.40  The Court first noted that certain trial rights, such as 
punitive damages and the right to a jury trial, were only available through a 
Bivens action.41  More importantly, the Court emphasized the deterrent 
effect of having a claim for damages directly against an officer who acted 
unconstitutionally.42  Finding no reason to refrain from creating a Bivens 
action for Green’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the lower court’s holding that Eighth Amendment claims could be 
vindicated in a Bivens action.43 
In between Bivens and Carlson, the Court also recognized that a 
Bivens action exists for Fifth Amendment sexual discrimination claims.44  
To this day, the Supreme Court has not extended Bivens beyond the claims 
recognized in Bivens, Carlson, and Davis.45 
B.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS REMAIN STRONG DESPITE 
RETRENCHMENT OF BIVENS 
After Carlson, the Court entered an era of reluctance, if not downright 
hostility, towards recognizing new Bivens claims.  For the next two 
decades, the Court relied on special factors or sufficiently good alternative 
remedy schemes to reject Bivens claims brought under new amendments,46 
different clauses in accepted amendments,47 or the same clause but in the 
context of military service.48  However, despite the Court’s reluctance to 
extend Bivens, it continued to allow Eighth Amendment Bivens claims. 
For example, in McCarthy v. Madigan, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
prisoner was not required to exhaust prison administrative remedies before 
filing a Bivens action seeking only damages.49  In coming to this 
 
 40 Id. at 20–21. 
 41 Id. at 20–22. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 24. 
 44 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 
 45 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017) (“These three cases—Bivens, Davis, 
and Carlson—represent the only instances in which the Court has approved of an implied 
damages remedy under the Constitution itself.”). 
 46 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens claim brought for 
violation of plaintiff’s First Amendment rights). 
 47 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (rejecting a Bivens claim under the due 
process component of the Fifth Amendment rather than the equal protection component). 
 48 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (rejecting a Bivens claim for racial 
discrimination brought by enlisted navy man against commanding officer). 
 49 McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149 (1992). 
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conclusion, the Court considered the fact that Congress had not explicitly 
required exhaustion, the inability of the grievance procedure to provide 
monetary relief, or the onerous timetable for filing administrative claims—
which the Court saw as a “likely trap for the inexperienced and unwary 
inmate.”50 While the majority recognized that requiring exhaustion prior to 
allowing a Bivens claim was certainly within their discretion, they refused 
to impose a requirement that would hamstring Bivens claims. Given that the 
Court had typically been unwilling to extend Bivens in the face of implicit 
congressional intent to require administrative action,51 McCarthy seemed to 
stand out as a rare win for Bivens. Although the Prison Litigation Reform 
Act of 1996 would make McCarthy a moot point,52 it at least stood for the 
proposition that the Court was not going to restrain existing Bivens claims 
without congressional action. 
By 1994, it appeared that Bivens was a cemented part of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. In Farmer v. Brennan, the entirety of the Court’s 
discussion of the validity of bringing Farmer’s claim under Bivens was a 
sentence explaining the procedural background of the case and string cites 
to Bivens and Carlson.53 Although Farmer, like Carlson, involved a claim 
for deliberate indifference to a serious harm, the facts of Farmer could have 
at least plausibly required a Bivens analysis before reaching the merits. 
Dee Farmer was a transsexual prisoner who, despite identifying as 
female, had been placed in a men’s prison pursuant to a practice of housing 
prisoners by reference to their biological sex.54 After a disciplinary transfer 
to a higher security prison, Farmer was placed in general population, where 
she was almost immediately sexually assaulted in her cell.55 Farmer filed a 
Bivens claim against the prison warden, claiming that placing her in general 
population amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm 
based on the history of inmate assaults and Farmer’s unique vulnerabilities 
to being assaulted.56 While Farmer’s claim clearly fell under the same 
general prohibition—that prison officials not be deliberately indifferent to a 
risk of serious harm—as the claim in Carlson, it was unclear whether the 
 
 50 Id. at 152–54. 
 51 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (rejecting Bivens claim where Congress 
had provided administrative mechanism for resolving plaintiff’s claim). 
 52 See, e.g., Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the PLRA had 
overruled McCarthy by expressly requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
 53 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994). 
 54 Id. at 829. 
 55 Id. at 829–30. 
 56 Id. at 830–31. 
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Court had meant for Carlson to include all of the permutations of this broad 
prohibition.57 
The Court in Carlson noted that a “special factor” which could 
preclude a Bivens claim included whether such claims “might inhibit 
[prison officials’] efforts to perform their official duties.”58 Requiring 
prison officials to respond adequately to medical emergencies properly was 
clearly unlikely to do so, as providing medical care is one of their 
affirmative duties. However, requiring them to consider a prisoner’s unique 
vulnerabilities in every administrative decision, while mandated by the 
Eighth Amendment, could also impose significant constraints on an official. 
Despite the colorable argument that Farmer raises different considerations 
than Carlson, the Court’s opinion declined to engage in even a cursory 
Bivens analysis and instead accepted Farmer’s Bivens claim as valid with 
hardly a thought.59 
Thus, although Farmer’s substantive holding was injurious to prisoner 
rights, 60 it was at least procedurally a win for Bivens. What was unclear 
was how broadly Farmer’s affirmance of the Bivens remedy extended. 
Although not conclusively answering this question, the Court soon 
delineated other boundaries for Bivens actions claiming violations of a 
prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. 
C.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS REJECTED FOR PRIVATE PRISONS 
First, in 2001, the Court considered the interaction between Bivens 
claims and a new prison paradigm, privately managed prisons. In 
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, John Malesko attempted to bring a 
Bivens claim against a privately operated federal halfway house.61 The 
 
 57 It is notable that nearly all of the cases that the Court cites in sketching out the 
prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment in Farmer are cases that were decided after Carlson. 
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832–33 (explaining the protections afforded to prisoners by the 
Eighth Amendment) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993); Hudson v. 
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)). The only case from 
the pre-Carlson era is Estelle v. Gamble, which makes it unconstitutional for prison officials 
to be deliberately indifferent to serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 
(1976). Thus, Farmer can be read optimistically as a deliberate choice to extend Bivens to 
the naturally evolving protections of the Eighth Amendment, or pessimistically as an 
oversight. 
 58 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). 
 59 The only discussion of Bivens in Farmer is a single sentence and a string cite to the 
Court’s previous Bivens cases. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994) 
(“[P]etitioner then filed a Bivens complaint, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment”). 
 60 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that deliberate indifference required a showing of 
criminal, not civil, recklessness). 
 61 Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 64 (2001). 
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halfway house had implemented a policy requiring people housed below the 
sixth floor to use the stairs to reach their rooms.62 Malesko lived on the fifth 
floor, but was exempted from the policy due to a heart condition.63 His 
claim alleged that despite this exception, a Correctional Services Corp. 
employee had forced him to take the stairs, causing him to have a heart 
attack, fall, and severely injure his ear.64 
Although accepting that Malesko’s pleading amounted to an Eighth 
Amendment violation, the Supreme Court expressed hesitance in extending 
Bivens claims to a “new category of defendants.”65 The Court relied on 
three rationales in declining to create liability for private entities under 
Bivens. Foremost, the Court was concerned that entity liability undercut 
Biven’s goal of deterring “individual federal officers from committing 
constitutional violations” while also creating a “potentially enormous 
financial burden” on the entities.66 Additionally, the Court noted that 
prisoners in public penitentiaries did not have a right to sue the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) and that allowing private prisoners to sue federally 
contracted corporations would create awkward incongruities between 
public and private institutions.67 Lastly, the Court noted that persons in 
private detention facilities had alternative avenues of relief available to 
them.68 Not only did they have the normal channels of the BOP’s 
Administrative Remedy Program, but they could also bring state law tort 
claims which were not barred by sovereign immunity.69 While neither of 
these remedies standing alone had impressed the Court in the past as an 
alternative to Bivens,70 taken together they seemed to alleviate the Court’s 
concerns about the ability of prisoners to obtain meaningful relief. 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 68. 
 66 Id. at 70. 
 67 Id. at 71–72. 
 68 Id. at 72–73. 
 69 Id. at 72–74. 
 70 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (characterizing the BOP’s 
grievance procedure as a “trap for the inexperienced and unwary litigant”); see also Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971) (rejecting 
tort law as a feasible mechanism for relief in constitutional tort claims). Though the Court 
attempts to distinguish this case from Bivens, their argument potentially rests on the false 
assumption that all violations of the Eighth Amendment are cognizable in tort. See Minneci 
v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 130–31 (2012) (considering it plausible that some Eighth 
Amendment claims may not be covered by state tort law). 
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Although the majority of the Court refused to extend Bivens to include 
entity liability, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas in concurrence, 
took a far more hostile approach to Bivens.71 Justice Scalia branded Bivens 
as a “relic of the heady days in which the Court assumed common-law 
powers to create causes of action,” an exercise in “invent[ing] implications” 
that the Court had subsequently abandoned in at least the statutory field.72 
Justice Scalia advocated similar abandonment in the Constitutional field 
because an “implication imagined in the Constitution can presumably not 
even be repudiated by Congress.”73 His solution was to “limit Bivens and its 
two follow-on cases [Davis and Carlson] to the precise circumstances that 
they involved.”74 
Although Scalia’s position did not garner more votes than it had in 
Malesko, the number of justices willing to decline an extension of Bivens 
rose to eight in Minneci v. Pollard.75 Minneci, like Malesko, involved a suit 
brought by a prisoner housed in a privately operated prison.76 Unlike 
Malesko, the claim was brought directly against officers of the facility 
rather than against the corporate entity.77 Pollard, who had fractured both of 
his elbows in an accident, alleged that various officials had been 
deliberately indifferent in both treating and accommodating his serious 
injury.78 Although Pollard’s claim did not share the same risk of “enormous 
liability” that concerned the Court in Malesko, it still bore one key 
similarity: the corporate nature of the defendant, which meant state tort 
suits were not barred by sovereign immunity.79 
Since Pollard’s allegations were within the scope of tort law, the Court 
concluded that he had an alternative process for effectively vindicating his 
constitutional claim.80 As such, it held that no Bivens remedy should be 
extended to Pollard’s claim, though it left open the possibility that an 
Eighth Amendment violation not cognizable in state tort law may provide a 
feasible Bivens claim against a private prison official.81 Justice Scalia, 
 
 71 Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 565 U.S. 118 (2012). 
 76 Id. at 121. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 121–22. 
 79 Id. at 126–27. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 130–31. 
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joined again by Justice Thomas, concurred for nearly identical reasons as in 
Malesko.82 
Despite Scalia’s concurrence to the contrary, the Court’s post-Minneci 
Eighth Amendment thinking seemed to break down into two parts. On the 
one hand, the Court consistently refused to extend the Bivens remedy 
created by Carlson outside of claims brought by federal prisoners against 
public prison officials. In contrast, within the public prison claim space, the 
Court at least implicitly accepted that all forms of Eighth Amendment 
violations were cognizable as Bivens claims.83 This dichotomy was 
accepted by lower courts, who unhesitatingly extended Bivens claims to the 
entire constellation of Eighth Amendment protections.84 Further, even those 
prisoners who were incapable of asserting Bivens claim due to being held in 
private federal prisons could bring state tort claims, which some scholars 
have posited is equal or perhaps even preferable to having a Bivens claim 
available.85 The upshot was that post-Minneci, nearly every Eighth 
Amendment violation in federal prison was redressable through either 
Bivens or state tort law.86 However, the Supreme Court has put the 
continuing availability of a damages remedy for many Eighth Amendment 
violations in doubt with their decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi.87 
 
 82 Id. at 131–32 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 83 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 832–35 (discussing the various protections that 
are embodied by the Eighth Amendment). Although the Supreme Court does not say that 
violation of these protections could be cognized as a Bivens claim, their ready acceptance of 
Farmer’s claim, which is substantively different than the claim at issue in Carlson, seems to 
support the idea that all Eighth Amendment protections can be vindicated through a Bivens 
claim. Further, the Supreme Court has never subjected an Eighth Amendment claim to 
alternative remedies and special factors scrutiny merely because it sought protection of a 
different Eighth Amendment protection. 
 84 See, e.g., Burke v. Bowns, 653 F. App’x. 683 (11th Cir. 2016) (allowing a Bivens 
claim for alleged use of excessive force); Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(Bivens appropriate means for challenging conditions of confinement); Robinson v. 
Norwood, 535 F. App’x. 81 (3rd Cir. 2013) (punishment without due process). 
 85 See Alexander Volokh, Keynote Article: The Modest Effect of Minneci v. Pollard on 
Inmate Litigants, 46 AKRON L. REV. 287, 293–94 (2013) (arguing that state tort law may be 
preferable to Bivens for certain claims given lower burdens of proof and availability of 
respondeat superior liability). 
 86 The qualifier “nearly” is used because the Supreme Court in Minneci left open the 
question whether an Eighth Amendment claim by a prisoner in a private facility that was not 
cognizable in tort could be brought as a Bivens claim. See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 
130 (2012). 
 87 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 
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D.  ZIGLAR AND THE REWORKING OF THE BIVENS FRAMEWORK 
Although Ziglar certainly has serious implications for prisoner rights 
litigation, it involved the assertion of rights by persons detained in an 
entirely different context. Ahmer Iqbal Abbasi, along with many others, 
were detained for several months on a “hold-until-cleared policy” following 
the 9/11 attacks.88 During their detention, they were allegedly subjected to 
harsh conditions of confinement89 and violence from guards.90 Following 
their release, they brought claims against the Attorney General, the FBI 
Director, the Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner, and 
the wardens of the facilities where they were detained.91 The Second Circuit 
permitted their claims to go forward. In doing so, it relied on the fact that 
the claims were not “new” Bivens claims, and thus did not require 
consideration of alternative remedies or special factors that may counsel 
against extending Bivens.92 In finding that the claim was not new, the 
Second Circuit looked at two things: (i) whether the right injured was the 
same as in a previous Bivens case, and (ii) whether the mechanism of injury 
to that right was the same as in a previous Bivens case.93 Considering the 
claim as an allegation that “individual officers violated detainees’ 
constitutional rights by subjecting them to harsh treatment with 
impermissible intent,” it found that the claim “[stood] firmly within a 
familiar Bivens context.”94 This rights-mechanism analysis of novelty by 
the Second Circuit was vehemently rejected by the Supreme Court.95 
The Supreme Court opted for a test of novelty that would render 
nearly any claim not on the exact facts of one of the original three Bivens 
cases new. In providing a non-exhaustive list of examples of what could 
create a new Bivens context, the Court elaborated that novelty would be 
found, at a minimum, in situations that differed in 
[R]ank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at issue; the generality or 
specificity of the official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to how an 
officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; the statutory 
or legal mandate under which the officer was operating; the risk of disruptive 
 
 88 Id. at 1852. 
 89 Id. at 1853 (prisoners were held in constantly lit, tiny cells for over 23 hours a day, 
denied basic hygiene products, and denied most communication with the outside world). 
 90 Id. (“Guards allegedly slammed detainees into walls; twisted their arms, wrists, and 
fingers; broke their bones; referred to them as terrorists; threatened them with violence; 
subjected them to humiliating sexual comments; and insulted their religion.”). 
 91 Id. 
 92 See Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 234–37 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 93 Id. at 234–35. 
 94 Id. at 235. 
 95 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. 
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intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence of 
potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did not consider.96 
These considerations are weighed against the “three Bivens claims the 
Court has approved in the past”—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.97 Notably, 
the Court’s test for considering whether a Bivens claim is “new” is itself a 
novelty, bearing no citation to any previous Bivens case law. 
Applying their novelty test, the majority concluded, unsurprisingly, 
that the context of Abbasi’s claim was new.98 Having found novelty, the 
Supreme Court continued forward into a consideration of special factors.99 
Here, the inquiry was framed as whether special factors precluded 
claims against high-ranking executive officials, the detention center 
wardens, or both.100 The Court first enumerated several special factors in 
rejecting the availability of a Bivens remedy against the various high 
ranking executive officials responsible for creating the detention policy.101 
Concluding that allowing judicial intrusion into matters of national security 
policy would create serious separation of powers issues, the Court held that 
absent express Congressional approval, a Bivens action against those who 
formulated the detention policy was unavailable.102 
However, those same factors did not apply to defeat the Bivens claims 
against the wardens. Although ultimately remanding the final special 
factors analysis for these claims to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court 
nevertheless provided some reasons why a Bivens remedy may not be 
available.103 The upshot is that although Bivens on the surface retains its 
two-part inquiry, the inquiries are no longer completely distinct. The 
presence of special factors counseling hesitation—previously addressed 
after a finding of novelty—has become a means for finding novelty in the 
first place.104 This conflation, though confusing, is far less troubling than 
what the Court considered as special factors. 
 
 96 Id. at 1860. 
 97 Id. (Interestingly, although the Court describes the facts of Carlson, it cites to 
Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), a case where the Court had rejected a Bivens 
claim for racial discrimination arising in the military context). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1860–64. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 1865. 
 104 Id. at 1870. 
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II.  THE NEW TEST UNDER ZIGLAR AND THE EVISCERATION OF BIVENS 
Despite ultimately remanding the special factors analysis of a Bivens 
claim against the wardens to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court noted 
several special factors counseling hesitation for the Second Circuit to 
consider. 
First, the Court considered that Carlson involved clear guidance to 
prison officials that they were not supposed to be “deliberate[ly] 
indifferen[t] to serious medical needs” given that standard had been 
established by the Supreme Court five years earlier in Estelle v. Gamble.105 
In contrast, the standards for when a warden could allow guards to abuse 
pre-trial detainees was “less clear under the Court’s precedents” and 
therefore could potentially counsel hesitation before being the basis of a 
Bivens claim.106 However, as the Court acknowledges later in the opinion, 
lack of guiding law forms the basis for a qualified immunity defense to a 
Bivens action.107 Given that officers can already raise this defense, and 
could when Bivens was decided,108 it makes little sense to consider it as a 
bar to a Bivens claim. 
Additionally, the majority found that the alternative remedies in the 
form of habeas corpus or an injunction may be sufficient to displace a 
Bivens remedy.109 In doing so, it cited to four cases—Bush, Schweiker, 
Malesko, and Minneci––where plaintiffs had alternative means for 
obtaining not merely any relief, but money damages.110 Here, a denial of a 
Bivens claim would leave the prisoners with no money damages claim, and 
thus with an entirely different alternative remedy than the plaintiffs in the 
aforementioned cases. 
 
 105 Id. at 1864; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 106 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1864–65. 
 107 Id. at 1866 (“[A]n official loses qualified immunity only for violating clearly 
established law . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 108 After the changes to the qualified immunity inquiry in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 
223, 230 (2009) (allowing defendant more flexibility in asserting qualified immunity), it is 
in fact easier to assert that a right was not clearly established. This should militate in favor of 
Bivens—since there is significantly less cost to defend on qualified immunity—rather than 
against the Bivens claim. 
 109 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865. 
 110 See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 417 (1988) (money damages available 
through administrative proceeding); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 371 (1983) (same); See 
also Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 129 (2012) (state tort claim available); Corr. Serv. 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73 (2001) (same).  
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The Court’s last consideration in the special factors analysis is the 
legislative history of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).111 The 
Court noted that this Act contains no “standalone damages remedy against 
federal jailers.”112 It construed this absence as creating an argument that 
“Congress chose not to extend the Carlson damages remedy to cases 
involving other types of prisoner mistreatment.”113 
However, few clauses from the PLRA relate in any way to damages. 
Those that do provide that no recovery can be had for mental or emotional 
injury without a prior showing of physical injury or a sexual act.114 Another 
clause prescribes that a percentage of money judgments will be used to 
satisfy attorney’s fees.115 While both of these provisions certainly add 
caveats to awards of monetary damages, neither seems to preclude a 
particular class of damage award from being granted. 
Additionally, the rules of the PLRA apply not only to Bivens actions, 
but to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, constitutional tort claims 
brought against state actors; actions which Congress certainly did not intend 
to limit to solely Carlson-style claims for deliberate indifference to medical 
needs.116 While the PLRA may support an inference of Congress’s hostility 
to claims brought by prisoners generally, it certainly does not seem to 
differentiate amongst those claims in any way meaningful to a Bivens 
analysis. 
By the time the Court remanded Abbasi’s claim against the wardens to 
the Second Circuit, they had essentially set up an entirely new Bivens 
framework.117 In doing so, the majority not only eviscerated any hope of 
future extensions of Bivens, but also imposed impassable hurdles to 
prisoners seeking to remedy violations of many Eighth Amendment rights 
thought to exist under the former Bivens regime by providing lower courts 
with a number of new tools for rejecting a prisoner’s Bivens claim. This 
new test likely means that claims for violations of Eighth Amendment 
 
 111 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1997). 
 115 Id. at § 1997e(d)(2). 
 116 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (subjecting to liability any person who causes a 
“deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 117 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865. 
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rights other than ones identical to those asserted in Carlson118 will fail at the 
special factors portion of the renovated Bivens analysis. 
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT BIVENS CLAIMS POST-ZIGLAR 
The aftermath of the Ziglar decision drastically altered two parts of the 
Bivens framework. First, there is the initial question of whether a Bivens 
claim arises in a new context and thus mandates inquiry into alternative 
remedial schemes and special factors. Post-Ziglar, nearly every claim that is 
not extremely similar to Carlson v. Green is likely subject to this analytical 
gauntlet.119 At the Supreme Court level, no claim deemed novel has ever 
succeeded post-Carlson, and this trend is likely to continue, especially with 
the Court’s extensive special factors dicta.120 
While the Court focused on providing reasons for the Court of Appeals 
to hesitate in granting Abbasi’s Bivens claim for pre-conviction detention 
abuses, much of it was applicable to prisoners seeking relief for claims 
under the Eighth Amendment. The Court’s explanation of the meaning of 
the PLRA, of the availability of injunctive relief, and of judicial guidance 
for jailers are readily deployable by a lower court seeking to reject a Bivens 
claim brought by a federal prisoner. The combined negative effect of these 
two changes can perhaps be seen by considering whether a Bivens claim 
would have been available for the plaintiff in Farmer v. Brennan, a 
landmark case which at the time was readily accepted as a valid, non-novel 
Bivens claim. As previously noted, the argument for the Farmer decision 
being an improper extension of Carlson was “colorable”121 under the 
Court’s new Bivens framework, that argument is ironclad. 
Under the Ziglar test, the Farmer claim certainly presents a new 
context when compared to Carlson. Of the seven considerations 
enumerated by the Court, Farmer falls under at least three: (i) extent of 
judicial guidance available to officers in appropriately housing a 
transsexual prisoner; (ii) risk of disruptive intrusion of allowing the 
judiciary to consider administrative policies of prison officials for undue 
 
 118 Christian Patrick Woo, Comment, The “Final Blow” to Bivens? An Analysis of Prior 
Supreme Court Precedent and the Ziglar v. Abbasi Decision, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 549 
(2017) (concluding claims not on the exact same facts as Carlson are probably no longer 
cognizable under Bivens); Constitutional Remedies—Bivens Actions—Ziglar v. Abbasi, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 313, 313 (2017) (arguing that for the sake of candor the Court should “hold 
that the Bivens cause of action is limited to the facts of Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.”). 
 119 Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1865 (noting that for differences not to be considered novel, they 
must be “trivial”). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See supra Section B. 
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risks; and (iii) the presence of unconsidered special factors given the 
Court’s complete overhaul of special factors would certainly militate in 
favor of novelty. Even if these were not sufficient, the Ziglar test provides 
an open invitation for lower court judges to use creativity in deciding 
whether a case “is different in a meaningful way.”122 Finding that the 
context of Farmer’s Bivens claim was novel, a court would then move on to 
consider whether special factors or alternative remedies displaced a Bivens 
claim. 
The Court’s opinion in Ziglar also provides two ready reasons that a 
lower court could decline to “extend” Bivens to the facts of Farmer due to 
the presence of special factors or alternative remedies. First, the Court’s 
emphasis that the availability of prospective relief such as an injunction is 
sufficient to offset Bivens and will almost always be a reason to reject a 
Bivens claim. However, in accepting injunctive relief as a suitable proxy for 
Bivens relief, the Supreme Court implies that it is sufficient to simply fix an 
ongoing constitutional violation even if that relief does not stop the harm 
from happening in the first place. Certainly, Farmer could have attempted 
to obtain an injunction preventing the warden from requiring her to remain 
amongst the general population where she remained at high risk of sexual 
assault. Even setting aside the timing issues of obtaining injunctive relief to 
avert a significant risk of serious harm, under the Court’s reasoning, this 
“relief” is enough to refuse her any claim against the warden for the fact 
that she had already been raped. 
Were this cynical perspective on remedies not sufficient, the Court 
also notes that the PLRA may provide an inference of Congressional intent 
towards limiting Eighth Amendment Bivens claims to those seeking 
damages for failure to provide adequate health care. A court could readily 
follow this “arguable” line of reasoning into a rejection of Farmer’s claim 
for relief. Thus, applying the Court’s test in Ziglar retroactively highlights 
what a confused break from precedent it is. Landmark cases go from 
accepting the availability of a Bivens remedy without comment to declining 
to provide necessary relief for the violation of prisoner’s rights. 
IV. WHY EIGHTH AMENDMENT BIVENS RELIEF IS NECESSARY 
To understand why a damages remedy is necessary for enforcing 
Eighth Amendment rights in the federal prisons context, it is necessary to 
look at the animating concerns behind the creations of the original Bivens 
remedies, as well as the way the court has balanced those concerns against 
competing values such as separation of powers. 
 
 122 See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1859–60. 
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In its original formulation in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, the Bivens 
remedy was premised on three ideas: (i) the constitution provided 
meaningful rights to citizens and placed restraints on the government; (ii) 
the Courts of the United States are empowered with discretion in designing 
remedies that properly allow those rights to be vindicated; and (iii) where a 
damages remedy is “necessary or appropriate” for vindicating those rights 
one will be provided to a litigant claiming a constitutional violation.123 In 
ascertaining whether compensatory relief was necessary and appropriate, 
the Court primarily focused on the deterrent effect that money damages has 
on officer misconduct.124 
This emphasis on deterrence has also been evidenced when delineating 
the exact scope of the Bivens remedy. In Carlson, the question was raised 
whether the FTCA, a statute allowing recovery against the US for certain 
torts committed by federal officials, could offset a Bivens remedy.125 
Answering in the negative, the Court noted that the recovery against 
individuals provided a deterrent effect not provided by the FTCA, where 
recovery could only be had against the US more generally.126 Another 
question raised by Carlson was whether a Bivens claim brought by the next 
of kin relied on state survival actions for validity.127 In finding that the 
survival of a Bivens claim was dictated by federal law, the Court affirmed 
the appellate court which had stated that application of the state survival 
law would create the perverse incentive of making it “more advantageous to 
a tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.”128 
The interest in avoiding perverse incentives to violate constitutional 
rights clearly shaped the initial scope of the Bivens doctrine. However, after 
Carlson, the Court has never extended Bivens to a new claim. Despite 
reticence in recognizing new Bivens claims, all of the Court’s refusals to 
extend Bivens are explainable by considerations as to whether a damage 
remedy directly under the Constitution was necessary in order to deter 
further federal lawlessness.129 
 
 123 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
402–08 (1971). 
 124 Id. at 407–08; see also Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 62 (2001) 
(“Bivens’ purpose is to deter individual federal officers . . . .”). 
 125 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). 
 126 Id. at 21. 
 127 Id. at 23. 
 128 Id. at 18. 
 129 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (listing the Supreme Court cases in 
which the Court declined to extend a Bivens cause of action). 
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Most of these cases—Bush,130 Schweiker,131 Meyer,132 Malesko,133 and 
Minneci134—are situations where the Court declined to extend Bivens 
because the plaintiffs had available alternative forms of obtaining monetary 
relief directly against the offending officer or agency. While these 
alternative remedies may not provide equivalent compensation for the 
plaintiff,135 provision of any money damages remedy directly against the 
offender serves the deterrence function and thus justifies the Court’s 
decision to not create a largely redundant compensatory or deterrent 
remedy. 
Another two of these cases, Chappell v. Wallace136 and U.S. v. 
Stanley,137 involved constitutional claims relating to the military. In both 
cases, the Court recognized the unique constitutional relationship between 
the military and the various branches of government.138 Clearly aware of the 
unique separation of powers concerns that counsel judicial deference––if 
not judicial abstention––in military affairs, the Court stayed its hand instead 
of extending a Bivens remedy. Thus, these decisions do not reflect the 
Court’s consideration of deterrence values because they instead represent 
the Court’s awareness that military conduct is not theirs to promote or 
deter. 
The last case, and possibly the strangest, is Wilkie v. Robbins—which 
attempted to combine a series of discrete forms of government harassment 
into a single Bivens claim.139 Wilkie involved a suit brought against the 
Bureau of Land Management for various harassing tactics they utilized in 
an attempt to force Robbins to provide them with an easement across his 
property.140 Robbins attempted to unify this patchwork of offenses into a 
single constitutional claim located somewhere at the intersection of the 
 
 130 Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 131 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 132 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 133 Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 134 Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012). 
 135 Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 428 (rejecting an argument that because respondents have not 
been fully compensated for their injury the administrative scheme that the Court is deferring 
to is inadequate). 
 136 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 137 U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 138 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301 (“This case arises in the context of Congress’ authority 
over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other area has the Court 
accorded Congress greater deference.”). 
 139 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 140 Id. at 543. 
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Fourth and Fifth Amendments.141 Though the Court found that Robbins had 
no alternative means of redressing his grievance, it declined to extend him a 
remedy, holding that standards for properly distinguishing between lawful 
and unlawful federal actions were simply unworkable.142 Thus, Wilkie 
appears animated by the Court’s fear of over-deterring government actions 
by extending a Bivens remedy.143 This was because the Court, and arguably 
even the plaintiff—who brought his claim under two amendments—were 
unclear about which Constitutional right they were even attempting to 
vindicate.144 This uncertainty additionally cautioned the Court from creating 
a situation where they were impermissibly limiting executive action for 
reasons outside of their Bivens role as protectors of constitutional rights. 
Therefore, the Court’s Bivens precedents prior to Ziglar can be 
explained by whether the Court felt: (1) A Bivens remedy was necessary to 
deter actions by the federal government that were violative of constitutional 
rights and (2) whether countervailing constitutional concerns such as 
separation of powers counseled against judicial interference in a particular 
case. Against this backdrop, the Court’s decision to both create145 and 
reaffirm146 a Bivens remedy for Eighth Amendment violations allows us to 
at least begin with a presumption that a damages remedy is necessary for 
the adequate protection of Eighth Amendment rights. 
V. INADEQUACY OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT REMEDIES WITHOUT A BIVENS 
CLAIM 
This presumption of necessity is confirmed in the context of the Eighth 
Amendment because the remedies that remain when a Bivens remedy is 
removed inadequately protect Eighth Amendment rights. Without access to 
a Bivens claim, federal prisoners are left with three primary mechanisms for 
attempting to remedy violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. First, 
they must use the administrative mechanisms available through the BOP to 
seek relief for any claimed violation.147 Second, they can bring a claim 
against the government, rather than the individual officer, vis-à-vis the 
 
 141 Id. at 548. 
 142 Id. at 559–61. 
 143 Id. at 562. 
 144 Id. at 555–56 (noting that “there is a difficulty in defining a workable cause of 
action,” and that Plaintiff’s complaint was not based on an individual constitutional violation 
but based on “the course of dealing as a whole.”). 
 145 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 146 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 147 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) (DATE) (mandating exhaustion of administrative 
remedies prior to filing a claim in court). 
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FTCA.148 Third, either alternatively or in conjunction with their FTCA 
claim, federal prisoners can seek injunctions in order to curtail ongoing 
violations.149 However, without the opportunity to bring a Bivens claim, 
none of these remedies—alone or collectively—sufficiently protects Eighth 
Amendment rights.150 
A. OTHER COMPENSATORY REMEDIES DO NOT PROVIDE OFFICER 
DETERRENCE 
If prisoners are unable to bring a claim under Bivens, their remaining 
remedies do not provide them with a means to hold offending federal 
officers specifically accountable. A prisoner’s mandatory first choice option 
for obtaining compensation is the internal grievance procedure of the prison 
itself.151 This grievance system has onerous filing requirements,152 and has 
been rightly characterized by the Supreme Court as a “trap for the . . . 
unwary.”153 Further, resolving prisoner grievances internally keeps them 
from litigating their claims in court and from exposing prison practices to 
the court of public opinion. Thus, even if the difficult procedural hurdles of 
the BOP grievance procedure remediate more claims than they cause to be 
forfeited; they do so in a way that avoids public censure and probably 
undercuts rather than promotes deterrence values. Further, since running the 
administrative gauntlet is a necessary precursor to seeking judicial relief, 
administrative relief is naturally conditioned by the risk faced by prison 
officials should a dissatisfied prisoner choose to file a lawsuit. Therefore, 
where that risk is minimized by inadequate judicial remedies, flaws with the 
grievance system are further magnified. 
Without access to a Bivens claim, the only judicial remedy available to 
prisoners claiming a violation of their Eighth Amendment rights is the 
FTCA.154 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that allowing 
persons to sue an entity in place of an offender does not further the 
 
 148 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2013).  
 149 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (DATE) (explaining procedures for obtaining injunctive relief 
for violations of prisoner rights). 
 150 See generally infra pp. 29–33 (discussing insufficiency of alternative remedies for 
protecting Eighth Amendment rights currently secured by Bivens claims). 
 151 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(DATE) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
 152 See       generally       U.S.      DEPARTMENT       OF        JUSTICE,       FEDERAL       BUREAU     
OF PRISONS, 1330.13, CHANGE NOTICE (2002), available at https://www.law.
umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/Documents/Resources/Prison_and_Jail_Grievance_
Policies/US_Bureau_of_Prisons_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/U99U-FZ85]. 
 153 McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (rejecting grievance procedures as 
an adequate substitute for Bivens relief). 
 154 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (DATE). 
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deterrence function that lays at the core of Bivens.155 In addition, the 
Supreme Court has expressly rejected the FTCA as a substitute for Bivens 
relief, noting its inferior procedural and remedial rights.156 Lastly, both the 
Court and commentators have expressly found that the goal of the FTCA 
was not to supplant Bivens, but to provide a “parallel, complementary 
cause[] of action.”157 This view is borne out by the legislative history of the 
FTCA.158 Thus, although the FTCA may function effectively as a 
compensatory remedy, giving access to the significantly deeper pockets of 
the U.S. government, it does not serve a deterrent purpose because it was 
intentionally designed to supplement, not supplant, a Bivens remedy in 
cases where Federal officers violate constitutional rights. Clearly, a remedy 
designed with the deterrence values of Bivens in mind does not provide an 
adequate remedy when that deterrence ceases to be available. 
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NOT A FEASIBLE MECHANISM FOR 
REMEDIATING ONGOING HARMS 
The last remedy for Eighth Amendment violations is injunctive relief. 
Injunctive relief, however, will rarely serve a deterrence function. This is 
because injunctions are a prospective remedy, which prevents them from 
having anything more than marginal deterrence value. 
Injunctions may be able to provide some relief at the margins, for 
instance in cases where prisoners claim they are exposed to significant risk 
of serious harm. At least theoretically, if an injunction is issued before the 
risk is realized, the harm may be avoided. Even in these cases injunctions 
remain problematic for three reasons. First and most importantly, prisoners 
have a constitutional right not to have prison officials be “deliberate[ly] 
indifferen[t] to a substantial risk of serious harm.”159 Therefore, without a 
retrospective component, the Eighth Amendment right is not protected for 
the entire time that a prisoner spends litigating an injunction. This time is 
especially significant, as often risks that rise to the level of constitutional 
violations will be realized prior to successfully litigating injunctive relief. 
 
 155 Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (explaining that entity liability 
does not deter individual officers); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) (noting the 
FTCA does not adequately fulfill the deterrence purpose of Bivens). 
 156 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21–23 (rejecting the FTCA as a Bivens substitute because 
Bivens provides access to punitive damages and trial by jury, rights not available under 
FTCA). 
 157 Id. at 19–20; see also Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 15. 
 158 See S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973) (“innocent individuals [subject to constitutional 
violations] will have a cause of action against Federal agents and the Federal government”). 
 159 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). 
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Such was the case in Farmer, where plaintiff, a transsexual prisoner was 
raped only two weeks after being placed in general population according to 
her birth—rather than her expressed—gender.160 Because of this reality, 
even where injunctive relief is readily available, it will often remain 
ineffective to protect Eighth Amendment rights. 
Second, the effectiveness of this relief is further strained by the fact 
that injunctive relief is significantly curtailed under the PLRA. Under the 
PLRA, prospective relief may not be granted unless a court finds “such 
relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the violation of the federal right.”161 Finally, any injunctions that are 
granted may be terminated after two years.162 As such, injunctions are an 
unfavorable mechanism for enforcing prisoner rights. 
These provisions underscore the irony of the Court in Ziglar pointing 
to injunctive relief as an alternative remedy.163 The Court’s central rationale 
for not extending Bivens relief in Ziglar was to avoid separation of powers 
conflicts. In justifying its reticence to impose additional remedies on these 
actors the Court points to injunctions as a feasible way for plaintiffs to 
obtain relief for conditions of detention.164 In doing so, it contravenes a 
congressionally established policy goal of avoiding injunctions as a means 
of remediating conditions of confinement. Thus, the Court pushes prisoners 
from utilizing a congressionally approved method,165 towards a mechanism 
that is both a bad solution, and a solution that Congress has expressly 
disclaimed as in line with its policy goals.166 Thus, the Court’s “solution” 
for prisoners who are deprived of Bivens relief actually creates more 
conflicts with express congressional policies than a Bivens claim would. 
C. OTHER REMEDIES DO NOT FULLY PROTECT EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
The shortcoming of alternative remedies highlights the need for a 
direct damages remedy to incentivize prison officials to properly respect 
constitutional rights. Alternative damage remedies do not provide 
 
 160 Id. at 830. 
 161 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 162 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 163 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1862 (2017). 
 164 Id. at 1865. 
 165 S. REP. NO. 93-588, at 3 (1973). 
 166 See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (2012) (placing limits on injunctive relief in prison 
condition litigation). 
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meaningful deterrence, providing relief only after the fact, while doing little 
to deter officers from committing offenses in the first place. 
Protections obtainable outside of damages are significantly hampered 
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which severely curtails the ability of 
federal courts to provide injunctive relief with respect to prison litigation.167 
Various statutory limitations on injunctive relief hamstring equitable relief, 
as does the fact that in many cases, an injunction is simply an awkward way 
to frame relief. Taken together, prospective court orders do very little to fill 
the gap left if Bivens is eliminated. Limitations on an already imperfect 
form of relief make clear that a direct damages remedy for Eighth 
Amendment violations is absolutely necessary if the Eighth Amendment’s 
protections are to be realized. 
This function of damages as a necessary means for effectuating Eighth 
Amendment and other constitutional protections is left in serious doubt 
after the Ziglar decision. By inviting lower courts to reconsider the 
availability of damages for Eighth Amendment claims that differ even 
nominally from Carlson, and then by allowing them to foreclose relief even 
where no alternative means of obtaining direct money damages exist, the 
Supreme Court has created a framework wherein lower courts may abdicate 
their role of guaranteeing that constitutional rights are properly respected by 
federal officials. 
D. A LACK OF JUDICIAL CANDOR MEANS THAT THE BIVENS GAP MAY 
NOT BE FILLED BY CONGRESS 
The final issue created by the Ziglar opinion is that it does not curtail 
the availability of Bivens candidly, putting other institutions—primarily 
Congress—that many Bivens claims will no longer be feasible. By keeping 
the structure of the old Bivens two-part analysis, the Court makes it seem on 
the surface that little has changed in the Bivens doctrine. However, the 
reformulation of the substance of the test means that Bivens claims are now 
limited to facts similar, if not identical, to Bivens, Carlson, and Davis.168 
By making this change without candidly acknowledging the goal of 
significantly limiting Bivens claims, the Court has not given proper notice 
to Congress, who is well positioned to fill the gap left by Bivens. Given that 
there is strong evidence that Congress approves of, and even relies upon, 
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 168 See Woo supra note 118. 
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the availability of a direct damages remedy against federal officers,169 the 
Court’s stealth elimination of much of the scope of Bivens means that it 
may be difficult to quickly fill the gap left by Ziglar. This is especially so 
because the group most significantly affected by this change, federal 
prisoners, has a weak presence in politics due to heavy disenfranchisement 
of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated persons.170 
Justice Thomas, concurring in the Ziglar judgment, again took a hard 
anti-Bivens stance, labeling Bivens a “relic of the heady day in which this 
Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action” and 
advocating “limiting Bivens and its progeny . . . to the precise 
circumstances that they involved.”171 Ironically, this two-paragraph 
lambasting of Bivens may have done a better job of protecting rights 
secured by Bivens than the majority’s complex method of reaching 
substantively the same result. Had the Court clearly and emphatically stated 
that Bivens was dead, stakeholders could immediately begin seeking a 
replacement from other sources. Instead, we are left with Schrödinger’s 
Bivens, uncertain if the doctrine retains any vitality at all until it begins to 
be applied by the lower courts. This uncertainty is an impermissible state 
for a person’s constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Though the Supreme Court has historically acted cautiously in 
expanding the availability of Bivens, it has never failed to provide a Bivens 
remedy in order to deter federal officers where no other adequate 
mechanism existed. In doing so the Court has carved out a small but vital 
niche for Bivens in the context of prison litigation. The role of Bivens as the 
primary mechanism for deterring violations of Eighth Amendment rights by 
individual officers has been entrenched, not just by practice, but by 
legislation. Other remedies have evolved not to displace but to complement 
the direct damage remedy provided by a claim directly under the 
constitution. Due to this, Bivens has become critical in the Eighth 
Amendment context given its acceptance by all relevant actors. 
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ensuring rights). 
 170  Ed Pilkington, Felon Voting Laws to Disenfranchise Historic Number of Americans 
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This remedial ecosystem was endangered by the Supreme Court in its 
decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which significantly reworked the framework 
for analyzing whether a Bivens claim was available with no attention paid 
to whether alternative remedial mechanisms would be able to fill the gap 
left if a Bivens remedy was not provided. By eschewing this methodology, 
the Ziglar Court has cast doubt on the continuing vitality of Bivens as a 
means for ensuring that violations of Eighth Amendment rights are 
vindicated properly––not merely through compensation, but also by 
deterrence. Without the deterrence provided by a Bivens remedy, federal 
prisoners are left with remedies that do an insufficient job of protecting 
Eighth Amendment Rights. As such, the Eighth Amendment rights of over 
one hundred thousand federal prisoners to second-class status as compared 
to their state counterparts.  
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